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L THE LATIN AMERICA FREE TRADE AREA fLAFTAP 
LAFT A was created in 1960 by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay through the Treaty of 
Montevideo. 2 Columbia and Ecuador joined LAFT A in 1961. 
Venezuela and Bolivia entered in 1966 and 1967, respectively. 
LAFTA encompasses every Latin America Nation except Guyana, 
Surinam, and Honduras.8 
LAFTA attempted to create a free trade area whose principal 
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1. W. Agor and A. Suarez, The Emerging Latin American Political Subsystem, D.A. 
CHALMERS, CHANGING LATIN AMERICA: NEW INTERPRETATIONS OF ITS POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 
155, 159-160, 162 (1972); INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, THE 
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING, 282 (1966) [hereinafter 
cited as THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM]; K. Simmons, International Economic Organizations 
in Central and Latin America and the Caribbean: Regionalism and Sub-Regionalism in the 
Intergration Process, 19 INT'L. & COMP. L. Q. 376, 381 (1970); G. Wixom, Latin American 
Free Trade Associations: An Attempt At Economic Integration, 1967 UTAH L. REV. 297 
(1967); F. ORREGO-VICUNA, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LATIN AMERICAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION, 
1967; Washington Panel: Institutional and Economic Perspectives on Latin American In-
tegration, 61 PRoc. A. S. INT'L. LAW. 167 (1967). 
2. Montevideo Treaty, done February 18, 1960, reprinted in THE INTER-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 485. 
3. See Lee, LAFTA Today, 44 MEXICAN REV. 24 (1976); LATIN AMERICA: THE STRUG-
GLE WITH DEPENDENCY AND BEYOND (Chilcot & Edelstein eds. 1974); THE CHANGING LEGAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL IN LATIN AMERICA: MANAGEMENT IMPLICATIONS (Holland & Ferrer eds., 
1974). 
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mechanism for integration is an annual bilateral negotiation 
system for trade concessions on an item-by-item basis. Under 
LAFTA it was intended that memberc states eliminate duties and 
other economic duties and other economic barriers on intra-area 
movements of goods. The Montevideo Treaty set the annual rate 
of tariff reduction at eight percent of the weighted average of 
prevailing duties on imports for third-world countries.' There was 
a provision for triennial negotiations of a common schedule, or list 
of products, to be free from trade barriers, thus creating a free 
trade zone.5 All parties, however, would have had to agree on the 
common schedule.6 
The mechanisms for coordination were covenants between 
equal partner countries rather than a supranational authority. 
There were escape or "savings" clauses7 for agricultural products 
and for balance of payment situations. Under the "savings" 
clauses each nation was given an opportunity to exercise a "public 
policy" exception to be used for the protection of morality, 
maintenance of security, and protection of national heritage.8 Also, 
restrictions on free trade areas might be allowed in cases where 
untoward effects on the economy of a particular nation were pro-
duced.9 
4. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 5. A more detailed explanation of the 
calculations involved is found at Title I of Protocol No. 1. 
5. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2 at art. 7, art. 8. See also Montevideo Treaty, 
supra note 2 at Title VI of Protocolo No. 1. 
6. URQUIDI, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A 
COMMON MARKET (1968). 
7. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at Ch. VI, arts. 23-26, SAVINGS CLAUSE, Ch. VII, 
art. 27-31, SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING AGRICULTURE. 
8. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 53. Article 53 provides: 
No provision of the present Treaty shall be so construed as to constitute an im-
pediment to the adoption and execution of measures to: 
(a) The protection of public morality; 
(b) The application of security laws and regulations; 
( c) The control of imports or exports of arms, ammunition and other war equip-
ment and, in exceptional circumstances, of all other military items, in so far 
as this is compatible with the terms of article 51 and of the treaties on the 
unrestricted freedom of transit in force among the Contracting Parties; 
(d) The protection of human, animal and plant life and health; 
(e) Imports and exports of gold and silver bullion; 
(f) The protection of the nation's heritage of artistic, historical and ar-
chaeological value; and 
(g) The export, use and consumption of nuclear materials, radioactive products 
or any other material that may be used in the development or exploitation of 
nuclear energy. 
9. Wionczek, The Rise and the Decline of Latin American Economic Integration, IX 
J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 49 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Wioncezk). 
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LAFT A provided for special non-reciprocal trade concessions 
(protection provisions) for less developed countries. Certain in-
dustries were accorded similar special non-discriminatory trade 
protections.10 There were also collective arrangements for finan-
cial and technical assistance.11 
The principle of reciprocity of benefits was adopted in the in-
itial agreement.12 In theory, each member nation would recipro-
cate with equal trade concessions. The theory of "complementari-
ty," or prior agreement as to the location of production facilities, 
recognizes that manufacturing tends to concentrate in countries 
where there is a large national market and greater industrial 
development.13 Under complementarity, the member countries 
agreed to a program of industrial allocation which would create a 
"spread" effect rather than a "backwash effect."1' Each par-
ticipating country was theoretically assured of benefits through a 
fair geographical allocation of new industries among the member 
nations. 
However, the Managua Treaty of December, 1960 abandoned 
the principle of reciprocity .15 Priority was given to the formation 
of a free trade area. Economic concessions became temporary in 
nature and capable of being withdrawn whenever the domestic in-
dustry produced a surplus. This exacerbated LAFT A's problem 
with the propensity of new manufacturing enterprises to locate in 
more industrialized member countries. The abandonment of com-
plementarity left the backwash tendencies unchecked. As a result, 
indigenous forces rather than regional planning influenced the 
location of new industrial activity. 
10. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2 at Chapter VIII. art. 32(a)-(f) "MEASURES 
IN FAVOR OF COUNTRIES AT A RELATIVELY LESS ADV AN CED STAGE OF 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT." 
11. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 32(e). 
12. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 8-13 (particularly Article 10). 
13. See Wixom, supra note 1, at 314-315 regarding "complementarity," and at 304-305 
regarding discussion of the problem of "center-periphery interaction" in the context of 
LAFTA. 
14. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 15-17 (generally). Article 16(b) pro-
vides: 
" ... The Contracting Parties: ... (b) May negotiate mutual agreements on complementary 
economies by industrial sectors." 
15. The Managua Treaty, done December 13, 1960, T.I.A.S. No. 6543 (effective 1963). 
The official Spanish-language text is at pp. 4-67; the English-language translation appears at 
68-200 (even-numbered pages only); and the French-language translation appears at pp. 
69-201 (odd-numbered pages only). 
3
Golbert and Gingold: Latin American Economic Integration
Published by SURFACE, 1980
186 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:183 
In 1967, United States President Lyndon Johnson met with 
Latin American heads of state at Punta del Este. They agreed 
that 1985 would be the target date for converting LAFTA from a 
free trade association into a common market.11 Thereafter there 
was a LAFTA meeting at Montevideo in 1968 to negotiate a se-
cond common list through the elimination of duties on wheat and 
petroleum. However, after four months of negotiation there was 
no agreement.17 
The Caracas Protocol in December, 196918 recognized that the 
integration movement had slowed since the mid-1960's. The 
Caracas Protocol was an effort by Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico 
to postpone the deadline for complete tariff liberalization from 
1973 to 1980. The Caracas Protocol in effect postponed the free 
trade area for an additional seven years beyond the target date 
set by the Montevideo Treaty. The proposal to convert LAFT A in-
to a common market was delayed indefinitely. While the 
Montevideo Treaty set annual rates of tariff reduction at 80/o of 
the weighted average of prevailing duties on imports for third-
world countries, 19 the Caracas Protocol reduced this to 2.90/o as of 
1970.20 
Many reasons have been advanced for LAFT A's lack of pro-
gress toward a common market. One reason is that LAFTA's 
scope was too broad.21 LAFTA put less developed nations in the 
same category as intermediately developed nations and the "Big 
Three."22 Additionally, although Latin America looks like one 
uniform piece of land on a map, it is divided by mountain ranges, 
rivers, and extended distances. There is also a system of previous-
16. Simmonds, supra note 1, at 385. 
17. Id., at 384. 
18. Id., at 396. 
19. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 5. 
20. Noted in Simmonds, supra note l, at 396. 
21. BLASSA, DESARROLLO ECONOMICO y LA INTEGRACION (1965) [hereinafter cited as 
Blassa]. 
22. I.e., Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. See A.L. Valdez, The Andean Foreign Invest-
ment Code: Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Valdez]. This prob-
lem of "sub-regionalism" has caused serious problems. See Simmonds, supra note 19, at 396, 
Agor & Suarez, supra note 19, at 159-160: 
The disparate size and level of development among LAFTA members . .. [has] 
been a constant obstacle to economic integration. The largest and most developed 
countries-Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico-appear to have benefitted dispropor-
tionately from intrazonal trade, and they have been reluctant to grant concessions 
to countries whose markets are "insufficient" . . . or "least developed . . .. " 
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ly established trade routes directed more toward traditional prin-
cipal markets than toward neighboring nations.23 
Another problem arose from the original premise upon which 
LAFT A was developed. The original theory propounded by Dr. 
Raul Prebisch and others to justify Latin American integration 
established the principle that planned national industrialization, 
could not continue to stimulate the growth of import 
substitution.24 Greater levels of production were needed than 
those which would satisfy local markets. 
The lesser developed nations risked becoming markets for 
the industrial surplus of the "Big Three." This market behavior is 
not reciprocal, however, since the dependence of the "Big Three" 
upon exports to the rest of LAFT A is not great enough for them 
to grant commercial concessions to poorer neighbors. 
It must be recognized that a free trade area is not a panacea.25 
It will not suddenly convert slow-growth economies into highly in-
dustrialized nations. Economic growth will be held back by social 
factors such as a low literacy rate, poor health conditions, under-
nourishment, a trend toward urban migration, and a high birth 
rate.26 Add to these factors a high rate of inflation, an unequal 
distribution of land, subsistence agriculture, and little technology 
and the difficulties begin to increase geometrically. 
IL THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
fCACMJ 21 
The CACM was established by the General Treaty of Central 
23. See Blassa, supra note 21. 
24. Rose, Third World 'Commodity Power' Is a Costly Illusion, FORTUNE (Nov., 1976); 
STRETEN & ALSON, DIVERSIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF COFFEE (1971). 
25. Blassa and Stoutjestijk, Economic Integration Among Developing Countries, 
XIV, J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 37, 82 (1975), 
Integration is not a panacea, however, by enlarging the market it can provide a 
suitable framework for economic growth but the results will greatly depend on the 
economic policies to be followed .... Increased investments are necessary which 
will not be forthcoming if foreign investment is discouraged and domestic savings 
are not generated. Also, changes in the social structure will often be called for .... 
26. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 283. 
27. Gordon, Developed, Developing and Dependent Nations: Central American 
Development in a New Economic Realignment, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1976); [hereinafter 
cited as Gordon]; URQUIDI, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: 
TOWARD A COMMON MARKET (1968); WATKIN, TAXES AND TAX HARMONIZATION IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA (1967) [hereinafter cited as Watkins]: Lizano and Willmore, SECOND 
THOUGHTS ON CENTRAL AMERICA: THE ROSENTHAL REPORT, XIII J. COMM. 
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American Economic Integration of 1961.28 Guatemala, El Salvador, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua were signatories to the treaty. 
The goal of the Central American Common Market for economic 
development is to achieve intra-regional free trade of products 
originating in Central America. Integration is a means of diversify-
ing production, developing import substitutes, and compensating 
for slow growth of exports. CACM also seeks to establish uniform 
tariffs for products imported from outside Central America. 
CACM has its roots in the United Nations Economic Commis-
sion for Latin America (ECLA),29 which was organized in Santiago 
in 1948. One constituent of the ECLA was the Committee on 
Economic Cooperation for the Isthmus of Central America or 
"Economic Cooperation Committee" (ECC).30 In 1956 the ECC 
published the Nomenclatura Arancelaria Uniforme Centro-
americana81 which defined and classified all products subject to 
customs duty. The Nomenclatura was adopted by all Central 
American countries. 
On October 14, 1951, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (the Five Nations) signed the Charter 
of San Salvador and formed a political union, the Organizacion de 
Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA).82 A new ODECA charter, 
known as the Panama Charter, was signed on December 10, 1962.88 
Panama did not sign this charter, but on June 17, 1966, it subscrib-
MKT. STUD. 280 (1975); Schmitter, Central American Integration: Spil/,.Over, Spil/,.Around 
of Encapsulation?, IX J. COMM. MKT. STUD. (1972). 
28. Managua Treaty, supra note 150. The Treaty came into effect for El Salvador, 
Guatemala and Nicaragua in June 1961, for Honduras in March 1962, and for Costa Rica in 
November 1963; noted in Simmonds, supra note l, at 376. 
29. K.R. Simmonds, The Central American Common Market: An Experiment in 
Regional Integration, 16 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 911, 912 (1967). 
30. Id. at 915. 
31. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 284. The Central American Agree-
ment on the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges (1959) applied more than 97 percent 
of the NUCA listings as the basis of that agreement. 
32. Simmonds, supra note 29, at 914. "ODECA has been described as a regional 
organization within a regional organization" because of development out of the OAS. Id. 
ODECA was rocked in February 1969 by a bitter election for the position of 
Secretary-General, an election which eventually was annulled. This occurred in the context 
of hostilities between Honduras and El Salvador. Simmonds, supra note 1 at 395 (and n. 70 
therein). 
33. Simmonds, supra note 29, at 914. An English-language translation of the text of 
the Charter appears at Appendice 22, pp. 480-486, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra 
note 1. 
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ed to some subsidiary non-economic integration organizations of 
ODECA.34 
The Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American 
Economic Integration (Multilateral Treaty)35 was signed June 10, 
1958, by the Five Nations. The Multilateral Treaty set up an in-
terim arrangement which established a free trade area for some 
goods. It was accompanied by the Agreement on the Regime for 
Central American Integration Industries and Treaty of Economic 
Association (Integration Industries Convention).36 
The Integration Industries Convention had the goal of pro-
moting industrial plants in an integrated context. The Convention 
provided for subsidiary agencies, such as the Commission Cen-
troamericano de lntegracion Industrial and the lnstituto Cen-
troamericano de lnvestigacion y Tecnologia Industrial (ICAIT A).37 
The Convention also provided for a distribution of industries, but 
however, such distribution was confined to enterprises requiring 
access to the entire regional market. The convention did not apply 
to Costa Rica. 38 
The Central American Convention on the Equalization of Im-
port Duties (Tariff Equalization Convention), which was signed by 
the "Five Nations" on September 1, 1959,39 set up uniform regional 
import duties for products originating outside of the Five Nation 
area. The list of products originally totalled 270 products, but 
later 200 more were added. Tariff equalization was to be achieved 
through successive annual adjustments in national tariffs over 
two, three, or five years. 
The Treaty of Economic Association (the Tripartite Treaty) 
was ratified on April 27, 1960, by El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras,40 Nicaragua was not invited to participate. The Tripar-
34. The Charter itself entered into force in 1~5. Provision for subsequent adherence 
(in part or total) was contemplated in the "Transitional Provisions" subsequent to Article 30 
of the Charter. 
35. Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration, 
done June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6539, (effective 1963), Simmonds, supra note 29, at 915. 
36. Id. The 2 agreements were ratified by all the signatory nations excepting only 
Costa Rica. 
37. See, id., at 915, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note l, at 290. 
38. Simmonds, supra note 29, at 915. 
39. Central American Convention on the Equalization of Import Duties, done 1959, 
T.I.A.S. No. 6542 (effective 1963). 
40. Treaty of Economic Association, done 1960 (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras), 
383 U.NT.S., T.I.A.S. No. 5494 (effective 1961). 
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tite Treaty tried a approach different from a gradual establish-
ment of free trade. The Tripartite Treaty declared free of import 
and export duties all products, labor, and capital originating in, 
and traded among, the three member states, except for a limited 
number of commodities on which duties would be gradually 
removed.41 The labor and capital applications were never put into 
practice.42 
The General Treaty of Central American Economic Integra-
tion (General Treaty)43 which was signed in 1962 by the Five Na-
tions took precedence over earlier instruments. Its goals were to 
establish a common market and a customs union though no details 
were given.44 It accelerated the program for achieving free trade 
by five years and extended immediate free trade among the Five 
Nations by eliminating import and export duties on most intra-
zonal products with the exception of such important products as 
coffee, sugar, wheat, flour, alcohol, distilled spirits, and 
petroleum. 45 
The Managua Protocol to the Tariff Equalization Convention 
expanded the list of goods imported from outside of Central 
America which were subject to uniform duties.46 Later protocols 
placed uniform duties on other imports from outside the zone. 
Separate articles and other conventions established monetary 
institutions. While the Banco Centroamericano de Integracion 
41. Id., at art. III. 
42. Treaty of Economic Association, supra note 59, at art. VI. 
43. General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, done 1962, 455 
U.N.T.S. [hereinafter cited General Treaty]. The dates of signature and adherence, respec-
tively, for the Five Nations to the "General Treaty" of CACM were: 
El Salvador Dec. 1960 and June 1961 
Guatemala Dec. 1960 and June 1961 
Honduras Dec. 1960 and April 1962 
Nicaragua Dec. 1960 and June 1961 
Costa Rica Dec. 1962 and Sept. 1963 
The delay in Costa Rica's signature and adherence resulted from the 1962 election in that 
country, causing major opponents of adherence to the Treaty to be "removed from political 
power." Simmonds, supra note 29, 917. 
44. General Treaty, supra note 43, at art. I. However, most of the Treaty's provisions 
cover the free-trade area regime. 
See Wixom, supra note 1, at 308 for a discussion of these terms in the general con-
text, as well as that of "economic union." See also A. GOLBERT, Customs Union Theory v. 
Practice, 4 Sw. U.L.R. 250 (1972). 
45. General Treaty supra note 62, at art. III. 
46. Managua Protocol to the Tariff Equalization Convention, done December 13, 1960. 
454 U.N.T.S., T.I.A.S. No. 6542. 
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Economica (BCIE)47 was capitalized in U.S. dollars, the Central 
America Clearing House Agreement adopted the peso cen-
troamericano as a multilateral monetary base.48 However, the peso 
centroamericano is denominative to the U.S. dollar. Mexico joined 
this system in 1963. Additionally, a uniform customs administra-
tion system was attempted through the Codigo Aduanero 
Uniforme Centroamericano (CAUCA).49 
All of the above mentioned administrative institutions are 
limited to Central America. The members of CACM are also 
members of the · Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)50 
which was founded in 1969 by the United States and most Latin 
American nations with the notable exception of Cuba. IADB has a 
Fund for Special Operations which makes loans at local interest 
rates, and the loans are repayable in local currencies. The United 
States, Canada, Japan, eleven European nations, and twenty-two 
Latin American and Caribbean nations are members at the pre-
sent time. 
The unequal distribution of benefits and industries created an 
imbalance in regional development and trade such as in the pro-
blem of "final touch" industries51 which are engaged in the bottling 
or packaging of a product. CACM lacks strong centralized regional 
institutions and there is no supranational enforcement agency. 
The 1969 Soccer or Migration War52 between El Salvador and 
Honduras created serious consensus and cooperation problems 
between the two nations. The issue in the conflict was free move-
ment of largely illegal labor, mainly unemployed rural and urban 
labor, from densely populated El Salvador to less populated Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Honduras implemented "land 
reform" specifically directed at the squatters from El Salvador. In 
July 1969, El Salvador attacked Honduras in retaliation. The at-
tack stymied, but the war led to the suspension of trade in CACM 
between the belligerents.53 After the conflict Honduras put an em-
bargo on transit from El Salvardor, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, 
47. General Treaty, supra note 43, at art. XVIII; noted in Simmonds, supra note 29, at 
911. See also, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note l, at 290. 
48. GRUNWALD AND SALAZAR-CARRILLO, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: RATES OF EXCHANGE 
AND VALUE COMPARISONS IN LATIN AMERICA, (1972). 
49. As provided by General Treaty, supra note 43, at art. XXIX. 
50. See Nambeil, Stronger Role Seen For the IDB, J. COM. (May 26, 1976). 
51. See generally, Simmonds, supra note 19, at 379. 
52. Watkins, supra note 27. 
53. Id., at 395. 
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and temporarily dropped out of CACM.54 Protocols attempted to 
work Honduras into the system by giving Honduras preferential 
treatment. 
The greater industrialization of Guatemala and El Salvador 
led to Honduras and Nicaragua becoming markets for consumer 
goods. Nicaragua accumulated a deficit within the Five Nation 
zone, but was not able to increase intra-regional exports of its 
primarily agricultural commodities.55 In 1969, Nicaragua, in con-
travention of CACM agreements, introduced barriers to intra-
regional imports56 which were lifted only after other members 
ratified protoco'ls regarding equalization of fiscal incentives. Costa 
Rica, because of financial problems, imposed tariff surcharges on 
imports from extra-regional nations.57 Costa Rica also established 
a consumption tax on a list of regionally produced luxury goods. 
This tax had adverse consequences for Guatemala. 
Ill THE ANDEAN PACT fANCOM) 58 
In May of 1969, three years after the formation of LAFTA, 
the five Andean western nations of South America (Bolivia, Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) signed the Cartegena Agreement, 59 
and formed a customs union directed more toward the control of 
foreign direct investment than toward free trade within the group 
or harmonization of external tariffs.60 Andean nations desired that 
foreign interests neither gain control over the economy nor main-
tain current levels of participation. Bolivia and Ecuador were 
54. Id. 
55. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: 
PROFITS AND PROBLEMS IN AN INTEGRATING ECONOMY [hereinafter cited as PROFITS AND PRO-
BLEMS]. 
56. See BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA (1968), 209 and (1969), 70. 
57. PROFITS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 55. See also, Simmonds, supra note l, at 380 
regarding these trade-deficit problems generally. 
58. See BLUTH, THE ANDEAN PACT AND ITS MEMBER STATES-A STUDY IN CERTAIN FOR-
MAL ASPECT OF SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION, IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND 
SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1975, 367 (1976); R. Tanino, The Andean Code 
After Five Years, 8 LAW. AMERICAS 635 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Tanino]. D. 
MORAWETZ, THE ANDEAN GROUP: A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOP-
ING COUNTRIES (1974) [hereinafter cited as Morawetz]; Abbott, Bargaining Power and 
Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process: A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYR. J. 
INT'L L. & CoM. 319 (1976); Avery, Subregional Integration in Latin America: The Andean 
Common Market, XI J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 85 (1973); Wionczek, supra note 27. 
59. AGREEMENT OF CARTAGENA, done May 26, 1969, 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'S 910 
(1969) (effective Oct. 16, 1969). 
60. Gordon, supra note 27. 
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granted special treatment as less developed nations.61 Venezuela 
did not join the agreement at first because it objected to the 
removal of protective barriers that shielded its industries and 
feared that imports from other Andean nations, which have low 
labor costs, would have an adverse effect on Venezuela's industry. 
Venezuela later joined the Andean Pact.62 In September, 1976, 
Chile withdrew from ANCOM.63 
Objectives of the Cartegena Agreement included the promo-
tion of development of member states, the acceleration of 
economic growth rates, and the assurance of local benefits from a 
common market. From a free market standpoint the Andean Pact 
complemented LAFT A because AN COM was based on a concept 
of facilitating participation of Andean nations in LAFTA. How-
ever, ANCOM went further than LAFTA in establishing har-
monization and coordination conditions for converting the Andean 
Pact into a customs union and a common market.64 
The Andean nations agreed to eliminate all tariffs among 
themselves.65 The Cartegena Agreement of 1969 provided for 
automatic and irrevocable reduction of trade barriers by the end 
of 1978, the erection of a common external or outer tariff as to 
other nations, and the uniform treatment of foreign investment and 
capital.66 Members are committed to a non-negotiable reduction of 
trade barriers as to all but a few products. 67 There are in theory no 
negotiated tariff reductions as to specific products as in LAFT A. 
Under the sectoral program, industrial development would be 
allocated to individual countries. The program is a form of approv-
ed regional monopolies on the production of certain goods which 
61. Special provisions regarding Bolivi.a and Ecuador are noted in E. Ereli, The An-
dean Common Market, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 487, (1971). 
62. For the reasons behind Venezuela's delay in joining ANCOM, see Ereli, supra 
note 61, at 491; see also, 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 939 (1969) for the Protocol of Venezuela's 
adherence to the Agreement. 
63. See infra note 144 and the accompanying text. 
64. MORAWETZ, supra note 58. Colombia exported goods worth U.S. $247.8 million to 
other Andean nations in 1975; Peru was second with U.S. $130.1 million in sales; Gerardo 
Zegers de Landa, EL PACTO ANDINO Y LA INDUSTRIA SUBREGIONAL DE 
ARTEF ACTOS DE LA LINEA BLANCA 8 CUADEROS DE ECONOMIA 111 (1971). 
65. It was agreed that this would be done in stages by listing all products into four 
categories, to which different provisions would apply: (a) sectorial development; (b) common 
list; (c) products not produced subregionally; and (d) nonscheduled products, Agreement of 
Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 45. See also Ereli, supra note 61, at 492. 
66. Agreement of Cartegena, supra note 59, at art. 26-27, 45, 61-68, and 89-90. 
67. See Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 46. 
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avoids the backwash effect of industrial coagulation which plagued 
LAFTA and CACM. The sectoral development program is limited 
to a complementarity type of agreement with respect to petro-
chemicals. 
The Declaration of Bogota of August, 196668 expressed 
dissatisfaction with LAFTA. The nations agreed that the costs of 
laissez-faire treatment of private foreign capital were high and the 
benefits derived therefrom were limited. The Mixed Commission 
was established.69 It prepared two documents, the Constitutive 
Agreement of the Andean Development Corporation70 (signed in 
1968 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela) 
and the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement71 (The 
Cartegena Agreement), signed in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru. 
The Andean Pact has an administrative framework composed 
of the Mixed Commission, the Junta, the Consultative Committee, 
the Economic and Social Advisory Committee, and the Andean 
Development Corporation.72 The Mixed Commission is an inter-
governmental body, a permanent diplomatic conference with one 
representative from each member government which oversees the 
"integrative process."73 The Mixed Commission can act only with a 
two-third majority vote with no negative votes.74 The effect of this 
procedure is to write a veto into the provisions of the Pact. 
The Junta is like a board or a secretariat. It has three 
members who are citizens of any Andean Latin American country. 
The Junta makes technical decisions, and prepares plans. Any 
decision of the Junta requires a unanimous vote. 
Provision is also made for a liaison between the public and the 
private sectors through bodies such as the Advisory Committee 
and the Economic and Social Advisory Committee.75 The Advisory 
Committee consists of government representatives and advisors 
68. Ereli, supra note 61, at 491. The Declaration of Bogota, as one of the motivating 
factors leading to ANCOM, is noted in the Preamble to the Cartagana Agreement, supra 
note 59. 
69. Ereli, supra note 61, at 491. 
70. Id. at 491. 
71. See Agreement of Cartegena, supra note 59. 
72. Tanino, supra note 58. 
73. Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 7. 
74. See Ereli, supra note 61, at 492. 
75. Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 19-21. 
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from the private sector. It acts as a liaison between the respective 
national governments, the Junta, and the Mixed Commission. The 
Economic and Social Advisory Committee is the successor body to 
the Comite de Empresarios lndustriales del Grupo Andino,76 
which proposed the views of the private sector. The Advisory 
Committee provides a forum for consultation with the private sec-
tor and is composed of three business representatives and three 
labor representatives from each of the member countries. 
The Corporation Andina Fomento, known as the Andean 
Development Corporation, was formed in 1968.77 Venezuela has 
been a member from the Corporation's inception. The Corporation 
is headquartered in Caracas with capitalization of 100 million U.S. 
dollars. The purpose of the Corporation is to promote and finance 
projects for Andean integration. It is both a lending institution 
and a center for study and recommendation as to mechanisms for 
coordination of credit and investment agencies. 
The most important provisions of ANCOM regulate foreign 
investment. Shortly after its formation, ANCOM created the 
"Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital, and of 
Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties," more commonly 
known as Decision No. 24, or the ANCOM Foreign Investment 
Code.78 At the time of the treaty signing, American interests held 
approximately 5 billion U.S. dollars of foreign owned investments 
in the ANCOM nations.79 Foreign owned or foreign controlled 
enterprises are gradually required to divest majority ownership 
and control over a 15- to 20-year period.18° In order to accomplish 
76. See Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 22 regarding the Economic-
Social Advisory Committee. 
77. Ereli, supra note 61, at 495. 
78. Adopted December 31, 1970 with subsequent amendments adopted on June 24, 
1971, July 17, 1971, October 30, 1976, and November 30, 1979 via Decisions 37, 37a, 103, 109 
and 110, respectively. The text of Decision 24 is reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 152 
(1971). See also Valdez, supra note 22. 
Article 27 of the Cartagena Agreement provides that "the Member Countries commit 
themselves to adopt the provisions that may be necessary in order to put this system into 
practice within six months following its approval by the Commission." 
See also COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, ANDEAN PACT: DEFINITION, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS, 
(1973); Zamora, Andean Common Market-Regu/,ations of Foreign Investment: Blueprint 
for the Future, 10 INT'L LAW. 153 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Zamora]. Schliesser, Recent 
Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment Law, 7 INT'L LAW. 357 (1973) and 6 
INT'L LAW. 64 (1972). 
79. Lisocki, Andean Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW., 319 (1973). 
80. Valdez, supra note 22, at 8. 
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this nationalization of resources, the enterprises must register the 
value of their capital investment.81 The Treaty is not self-executing, 
and it provides only the agreed upon minimum standards governing 
continued or new foreign investment in the member states.82 
Stricter regulations, therefore, may be instituted in any member 
state by means of appropriate national legislation.83 
The goal of Decision No. 24 is to transfer to local majority 
ownership and majority control all foreign investment within a 
member states's borders. The period of time within which this is 
to be accomplished varies with the nation and with the type of in-
dustry involved. This underscores the link between the treatment 
of foreign investment and the development goals of subregional in-
tegration.84 The incentive to participate in a wider free market will 
theoretically outweigh the disincentives of regulation. Decision 
No. 24 requires existing foreign investors to divest to minority 
levels which may be enforced as a result of denied benefits of free 
movement of goods and services within a common market.85 Deci-
sion No. 24 regulates repatriation of capital (except liquidation 
proceeds, defined as the value of the original investment plus addi-
tions, less net realized losses) and the remittance of profits 
(generally not to exceed 20 percent per year of registered direct 
81. Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at _art. 5, 6; Valdez, supra note 22, at 8. See 
also Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Nor-
mative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 771 (1972) regarding 
discussion of the impact of the application of different treatment based upon the percentage 
of foreign ownership. 
82. Valdez, supra note 22, at 2. See also, Zamora, supra note 78, for a comparative 
analysis showing great variations in the approaches of Chile and Venezuela (Decree No. 62) 
and contrasting briefly the approaches of other countries. The disparity became so great 
with the passage of Chile's Foreign Investment Statute, promulgated in 1974, that Chile 
was specially requested to live up to its obligations under the Agreement Chile withdrew 
from the Cartagena Agreement, with a few exceptions not related to foreign investment, by 
Decision 102 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement on October 30, 1976. The 
Chilean statute provides that foreign capital may be used for "activities productive of goods 
or services of exceptional interest to the economic or social development of the country;" 
that no discrimination will be permitted to the detriment of the foreign investment, its pro-
ducts or manner of operation. It provides for direct access to relief from such discrimination 
if it is alleged and shown to exist, the failure of which relief gives recourse to the procedure 
of compensation by judicial proceedings. See articles 1, 5, and 6, Decree Law dated July 13, 
1974, as set forth at 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT1LS 1176 (1974). 
83. Generally, Ecuador's position as to foreign investment is as liberal as possible 
within the limitations of Decision 24. A. ANDERSON, TAX AND TRADE GUIDE 25 (1976). 
84. Oliver, supra note 81, at 780. 
85. Oliver, supra note 81, at 777. 
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foreign investment).86 The Decision also reserves to national 
ownership certain key investment sectors, including utilities, 
media, and the financial and transportation industries.87 
Enforcement is provided through the requirement that all 
new direct foreign investment and all contracts and transfers of 
foreigners for investment be submitted to and approved by an ap-
propriate national body .88 Freedom of contract with respect to in-
tellectual property is thereby limited.89 The use of such property 
cannot be tied to a sale of raw materials, and the foreign investor 
must limit exports of products manufactured under a license.90 The 
Investment Code makes illegal any payments of royalties to a 
foreign investor for the use of "intangible technology," which is 
not defined, but may include know-how.91 
The Investment Code places restrictions on foreign investors' 
access to local credit.92 Contracts for external credit must be au-
thorized and registered by local authorities and the amount of in-
terest paid on an intra-company loan between a foreign parent and 
an Andean subsidiary cannot be more than three percent above 
the going rate of interest on first-class loans in the country from 
which the loan is made.93 Foreign enterprise is denied access to 
other than short-term local credit.94 
Concessions to foreign companies are allowed regarding 
resources until 198195 but not as to depletion allowances. Any such 
concessions are limited to a twenty-year maximum time period.96 
Establishment of new foreign-owned companies is prohibited in 
the sectors of public services, insurance, banking, and finance. 97 
Prohibited sectors include radio, television, newspapers, and in-
86. Id., at 779-780; Valdez, supra note 22 at 11. 
87. Valdez, supra note 22, at 11; Oliver, supra note 81. 
88. Articles 2 through 4 of the Investment Code as noted in Oliver, supra note 81, at 
772. 
89. Valdez, supra note 22, at 10. 
90. Lisocki, supra note 79, at 320-323, 324. 
91. A. Alessandri, The Andean Approach to the Transfer of Technology 67-68 (May, 
1975) (unpublished manuscript). 
92. Lisocki, supra note 79, at 320. 
93. See Valdez, supra note 22, at art. 40. 
94. Id., at 13. 
95. See Valdez, supra note 22, at art. 40. 
96. Id. See also Lisocki, supra note 79, at 324; Oliver, supra note 81, at 775. 
97. Foreign Firms Get Cold Shoulder From Proposed ANCOM Investment Regula-
tions, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA 353, 354 (Nov. 5, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Firmsj. 
See generally S. Fouts, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 10 TEX. INT'L L. J. 537 
(1975). 
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ternal transportation in domestic markets.98 Foreign banking in-
stitutions must sell eighty-percent of their capital to domestic (An-
dean) sources within three years in order to continue receiving 
local deposits. 99 
The Investment Code prohibits agreement clauses that oust 
the host nation from jurisdiction over investment disputes.100 It 
similarly prohibits subrogation of foreign states to rights of na-
tional investors in investment disputes.101 Thus, the benefits of the 
U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are unob-
tainable in Andean nations because OPIC must succeed to the 
rights of a national investor after payment of a claim in order to 
permit diplomatic intervention.102 
It is unclear whether the Code clashes with the supposed 
minimum international standard of treatment of foreign property. 
The paramount question is whether the Code provides for compen-
sation if the foreign investor, through no fault of its own, is unable 
to find an acceptable buyer for its majority interest.103 Further-
more, the Code does not specifically take into account earnings re-
tained because of repatriation and reinvestment limitations. The 
limit of permitted reinvestment is generally five to seven percent 
of profits per year.104 In the case of limbo capital, an orderly sale of 
98. Note Venezuela's designation of restricted investment sectors. See Zamora, supra 
note 78. The Venezuelan Regulations are published in Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de 
Venezuela, Nos. 1,620 and 1,650 (Nov. 1. 1973 and April 29, 1974, respectively) as noted in 
the Zamora article. 
99. Foreign Firms, supra note 97, at 354; see also, Fouts, supra note 97. 
100. MORA WETZ, supra note 58. 
101. See Article 51 of the Investment Code as discussed in Valdez, supra note 22, at 15. 
102. As an initial result of Article 51's adoption, OPIC operations in the Andean na-
tions were suspended in 1972. See the Address by OPIC's President, Bradford Mills, at 
Johns Hopkins University (March 16, 1972); noted in Valdez, supra note 22, at 15. As Valdez 
points out, the impact of the Calvo Clause philosophy may have been behind the intent of 
Article 51. 
OPIC's authorization is codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a. Congress, in the 1978 
Amendments to OPIC, observed that, "After OPIC pays a claim and thereby becomes the 
legal claimant it may negotiate directly with the host government for settlement." H. Rep. 
No. 95-670, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 
618. 
103. Valdez, supra note 22, at 9, 17 regarding Articles 3(c) and 35. 
104. With the clarification of the definition of direct foreign investment (to include 
"reinvestments made in conformity with the Regime, along with the right of 
resources in national currency to be remitted abroad), if automatic reinvestments 
up to the 7 percent are honored, and investments above such percentage are 
authorized, then the ... frozen fund problem will disappear." 
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ownership overage to a governmental or private market is en-
visaged as well as an increased authorization for reinvestment 
that does not upset the majority control or ownership.105 With 
respect to limbo cash, the corporation presumably must retain 
these excess earnings in trust for the direct foreign investor until 
a time when they can permissibly be distributed to the alien. If the 
excess earnings are not held in trust, the question of "creeping ex-
propriation" arises with respect to uncompensated earnings.106 
The question then arises whether the state has any responsibility 
to insure adequate compensation to the alien investor for the re-
quired divestment of its majority ownership and rights of 
repatriation. The alien investor's dilemma is the choice between 
divestment at a loss (if no buyers can be found at a suitable price) 
or staying in business at a loss (in the face of the competitors' ad-
vantage of access to the common market). 
A problem exists not only as to whether the Code effects ac-
tual expropriation, but whether the expropriation is legal as well. 
The Code simply provides that member countries shall not grant 
to foreign investors any treatment more favorable than that 
granted to national investors, thus, the Code inferentially negates 
the idea of any substantive minimum international standard.107 
s. ROSE, THE ANDEAN PACT: DECISION 24 REVISED AS CHILE LEAVES 5 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as RosE]. These same comments apply to the increases in the profit repatriation limits. 
Both the reinvestment and profit remittance limit increases will be illusory unless the 
foreign investors are permitted to establish reasonable direct foreign investment bases 
either through reinvestments in their own companies or new investments in other sectors 
or in companies in their same sector. 
105. Upon authorization by the competent national agency, the owners of a direct 
foreign investment shall have the right to transfer abroad, in freely convertible 
currency, the verified net profits resulting from their direct foreign investment, 
up to 20 percent thereof per year. 
However, each Member Country may authorize higher percentages, reporting 
to the Commission the provisions or determinations taken in this respect. 
The competent national agency may also authorize the investment of surplus 
distributed profits, in which case the latter shall be considered to be direct foreign 
.investment. 
ROSE, supra note 104. 
106. Due to the importance placed upon the ultimate divestiture of the investment to 
local interests, there is only one possible legal vehicle to avoid divestiture under the Invest-
ment Code. This is Decision 47 of ANCOM applicable to any member state having ratified 
it. Under Decision 47, the foreign investor is allowed to maintain up to a seventy percent in-
terest in the local investment in order to avoid divestiture. However, the benefits under 
this decision are granted solely on a case by case basis by the local government. 
107. Regarding the "minimum international standards" concept and "state responsibili-
ty," Castel observes: 
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Thus, the Code presumably prohibits granting any transfer of 
direct foreign investment under terms restricting a foreign in-
vestor to a lesser degree than in the case of a national in similar 
circumstances. 
The question becomes what standard will apply for the pro-
tection of foreign owned property. As the Code by definition acts 
on the interests of foreign investors only, then if an alien claims 
that the Code effectively confiscates its investment without com-
pensation, the contention that the alien is only entitled to the 
treatment accorded to nationals will work against the ANCOM 
member.108 No nationals are therefore affected by the law. The 
right and duty of the alien's government, under customary inter-
national law, to protect its nationals, must be re-examined. The 
principle of just compensation should compel the alien's govern-
ment to demand that the recipient country permitting the alien's 
The standard of conduct which a State is expected to pursue in its dealings 
with aliens has been the subject of considerable controversy. The Latin American 
States, against which large numbers of international claims have been presented, 
have often maintained that no violation of international law is committed so long 
as there is no discrimination against the alien. It is thus a perfect defense to a 
claim, according to this view, to assert that nationals· of the respondent State are 
treated in the same fashion as was the alien. International tribunals have generally 
taken the view that, although a State must as a minimum not discriminate against 
aliens, its conduct must ultimately be judged by international standards, and that 
a State may not be heard in its defense to allege that its nationals are treated in 
exactly the same way as aliens. It may be said in defense of the position of the 
Latin American States that there may be some reason to apply local standards in 
the case of a natural or juristic person maintaining a permanent residence in a 
given State. Under such circumstances, the argument might run, the individual or 
corporation must be considered to have assumed the risk of residence in that coun-
try .... But when we turn from the protection of property to the protection of the 
person and of fundamental rights of the individual, it is difficult to maintain that 
the alien should have no protection under international law because all nationals of 
the country concerned are subjected to the same injustices. The international 
responsibility of States is a vast, complex, and ill-defined subject. It involves more 
than the responsibility of a State for injuries to the property or person of aliens. 
J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 1070 
(1976). 
Oliver, supra note 81, at 768 makes this point: 
Article 50, in a sense, approaches the "equality of treatment" viewpoint by the 
back door, providing that: 
"Member countries shall not grant to foreign investors any treatment 
more favorable than that granted to national investors." 
Foreign investors are not guaranteed national treatment. Under Article 50 they 
cannot have more than national treatment, which seems inferentially to negate the 
notion of a substantive international minimum standard. 
108. Oliver, supra note 81, at 784. 
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entry recognize its obligation under international law to afford an 
alien protection both for human and property rights. In reality, 
equality of treatment may be logically consistent with a definition 
of the alien's rights which hold the state liable for violation of the 
rights of its own nationals as well as those of aliens.109 Yet, disagree-
ment still persists as to exactly what such rights would entail. 
The European Economic Commission controls over direct 
foreign investment appear to have a different tenor from AN-
COM.110 ANCOM permits subregional investors (investors of one 
of the member nations) to make the same investments as a nation, 
subject to certain reporting requirements and product 
limitations.111 ANCOM ownership limitations, however, will pre-
vent any majority foreign-owned interest from l;>ecoming a na-
tional investor in any member state. The ECC envisions not only 
the free flow of capital, goods, and services between member 
states, but also specifically extends the right of establishment112 to 
109. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 744-45 (1971) citing 5 
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (1943). 
If the alien receives the benefits of the same laws, protection, and means of 
redress for injuries which the state accords to its own nationals, there is no 
justifiable ground for complaint unless it be shown that the system of law or its ad-
ministration falls below the standard generally recognized as essential by the com-
munity of nations. 
When the treatment accorded an alien falls below the standard required by in-
ternational law, the receiving state is culpable of violating an international legal 
interest of the state of which the alien is a national. 
See also W. Bishop, supra at 752: 
In his capacity as Special Reporter on State Responsibility for the International 
Law Commission, Garcia Anador of Cuba proposed that the standard should be 
that of equality with nationals, provided this should not be less than the interna-
tional standard of 'human rights' and fundamental freedoms .... 
For the purpose of the application of the provision of this draft, aliens enjoy 
the same rights and the same legal guarantees as nationals, but these rights and 
guarantees shall in no case be less than the "human rights and fundamental 
freedoms" recognized and defined in contemporary international instruments. 
110. It is suggested that the increase of U.S. investment in the EEC may be due in fact 
to economic integration. L. KRAUSE, DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT, EEC INTEGRATION AND 
THE U .8. (1968). 
111. As per Article 30, the general policy attitude toward "sub-regional" affairs is 
stated in §§ 1-3 and 5-6 of the preliminary declaration. 
112. See J. LANG, FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EEC, THE COMMON MARKET AND 
COMMON LAW 139 (1966); A. CAMPBELL AND D. THOMPSON, COMMON MARKET LAW. 47 (1962). 
Article 67 of the Rome Treaty provides: 
Member states shall, in the course of the transitional period and to the extent 
necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, progressively abolish 
as between themselves restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to per-
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a national of a member state which has its registered office, cen-
tral management, or main establishment within the community. 
No further investigation into the ties between the national and its 
member state is required, and the corporate law of the member 
state is dispositive beyond the specified requirements. Thus, if no 
foreign ownership limitations exist in a member state, the access 
of foreigners to the free market is uninhibited on the grounds of 
residence. 
A savings clause, "in the event of movements of capital 
leading to disturbances in the functioning of the capital market,"113 
allows the Commission to authorize particular protective 
measures. Significant limitations on harmful acts by foreign in-
vestors are also contained in the anti-trust provisions (Articles 85 
and 86) of the EEC.114 But the EEC provisions, with their substan-
tially different orientations towards direct foreign investment and 
illicit market activities, provide no justification for the ANCOM 
approach which, without true flexibility in administration, clearly 
raises expropriation issues, if only in a more organized fashion 
than other expropriative acts in Latin American economic history. 
Decisions 84 and 86 of the Andean Commission provide for 
the creation of a regional technological infrastructure and for the 
treatment of patents, licenses, and trademarks.115 The goal in the 
technological area is to acquire necessary but inexpensive foreign 
technology with few strings attached and to simultaneously build 
up local research and development capabilities. The policy is to 
prevent a form of double profit from technological transfer. An-
sons resident in Member States and also any discriminatory treatment based on 
the nationality or place of residence of the parties or on the place in which such 
capital is invested. 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 5 
(No. 4301). See also Nottebohn Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] I.C.J. 4, for the 
"minimum contacts" test under international law. 
113. The Rome Treaty, supra note 112, at art. 73. 
114. See 2 H. SMIT. & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A 
COMMENTARY,§ 85.06 (1976), regarding "incompatible" business practices in the EEC, and§§ 
86.13-86.20 regarding "abuse" of market position in the EEC. See also Joelson & Griffin, /11r 
ternational Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Engaged in by Transnational 
Enterprises: A Prognosis, 11 INT'L LAW. 5, (1977) regarding Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty 
of Rome, and id. at 14 regarding the OECD's 1976 GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTER-
PRISES. 
115. Promulgated at the Thirteenth Period of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Com-
mission (May 27-June 5, 1974, at Lima, Peru), 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1478, 1489 (1974). Note 
that patents, licenses and trademarks were previously regulated by Articles 18-21 and 24-26 
of Decision 24. 
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dean nations see foreign investors profiting once from technology 
as a fixed cost of the initial sale of a product and then profiting 
again from the foreign parent company sale of technology to the 
Andean subsidiary. Therefore, technological agreements may not 
be capitalized as direct foreign investments.116 Parent companies 
cannot receive royalty payments from subsidiaries incorporated in 
ANCOM for use of patents, trademarks, or licenses.117 More impor-
tantly, parent companies cannot receive payments for the techni-
cal assistance of trained personnel. 
Article 44 of Decision 24 states in part, "When, in the opinion 
of the recipient country, special circumstances exist, that country 
may apply other regulations than those provided in Articles 40 to 
43, inclusive (prohibiting enterprises in public services, banking, 
insurance, media, and transportation)."118 
Some observers hoped that Article 24 would provide a sav-
ings clause for the internal conflict over ANCOM's foreign invest-
ment restrictions. In an attempt to keep Chile in the Andean Pact, 
Decision 100, predicated on the powers of Article 44, was drafted 
to modify some of the foreign investment restrictions.119 However, 
this decision again provided too little. Chile not only desired an 
easing of the restrictions with respect to foreign investment in 
Decision 24 but also opposed all limits on profit remittances 
because "such limits scare off foreign capital."120 Instead, Chile 
favored unrestricted foreign investment and low tariff barriers. 
During negotiations, sources indicated that the other five coun-
tries agreed to a reduction of the common external tariff to 26 per-
cent while Chile held out for a 12 percent maximum.121 Chile main-
tained that the value of indigenous manufacturers and not the 
116. See supra at note 78, Decision, 24, art. 21. Note also that the Andean nations, 
through the Andean Development Corporation, pledged themselves to promote sel 
COMMENTARY§ 85.06 (1976), regarding "incompatible" business practices in the EEC, and§§ 
117. Id. at art. 21. 
118. Ecuador and Peru in 1971 also took advantage of Article 44's "option" to apply 
special regulations to certain industries, Perenzin, Multi-National Companies Under the 
Andean Pact-A Sweetner for Foreign Investors?, 7 INT'L LAW. 396, 397 (1973). 
119. For a review and analysis of the impact of Chile's decision to leave ANCOM 
because of the dispute concerning Decision 100, see BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, CHILEAN 
DISSENSION TO HAVE MINIMAL EFFECTS ON ANCQM TRADE PROSPECTS, 257 (1976); CHILE AND 
ANCOM: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND WHAT CAN RESULT, 29 (1976); CHILE'S TIES TO ANCOM 
CONTINUE STRONG THROUGH CAF (CORPORACION ANDINO DE FOMENTO) AND ANDEAN MNC'S. 
120. IV LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 35 (1976). 
121. IV LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 37 (1976). 
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ownership of shares should determine the nationality of com-
panies, and that the external tariff should not give excessive pro-
tection to local industries. Colombia agreed with Chile, while 
Ecuador and Venezuela held a hard line. Thus, Chile refused to 
sign Decision 100, the protocol modifying the Cartagena Agree-
ment, and announced its retirement from the Andean Pact.122 
In the latest modifications to Decision 24, Decision 109123 
declared agriculture a basic activity for Ecuador and Bolivia, 
thereby exempting foreign investments in this field from the pro-
visions of Decision 24.124 Individual foreign residents in member 
countries will now be allowed to remit profits and repatriate 
capital from investments by using locally generated funds.125 
Capital from international lending agencies and economic coopera-
tion agencies is considered neutral and exempt from the fade-out 
requirements of Decision 24.126 The Commission has also raised the 
limit on profit remittances by foreign companies from 14 percent 
to 20 percent.121 In earlier negotiations with Chile, the five coun-
tries remaining in ANCOM had offered to allow foreign companies 
to increase the annual reinvestment of profits from 5 percent to 7 
percent.128 
ANCOM still has some internal strains over the question of 
restrictions on foreign investment. Bolivia, like Chile, was drawn 
into the economic orbit of the "southern cone" and signed certain 
riew economic agreements with Argentina.129 Peru and Chile 
122. See Chile Withdraws from the Andean Group, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1446 (1976); 
Latin American Economic Integration: Chile Withdraws from Andean Pact, 9 LAW. OF THE 
AMERICAS 179 (1977). 
123. The modifications brought about by Decision 109 (Nov. 30, 1976) are integrated, in 
an English-language translation, with those of Decisions 37 (June 24, 1971), 37-A (July 17, 
1971), 70 (Feb. 13, 1973), and 103 (Oct. 30, 1976) to the codified text of Decision 24; See, 16 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977). 
124. Id. at art. 40, para. 2. 
125. Id. at art. 7. See also, Article 6(d) regarding the ability to repatriate funds in "free-
ly convertible currency." 
126. v LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 3, (1977); Andean Bloc Eases Investment 
Curbs, Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1976, at 6. 
127. IV LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 33, (1976) [hereinafter cited as REP. No. 33); 
id. at 12. 
128. Id. 
129. See BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Argentine-Bolivian Accord Offers Opportunities on 
Several Levels 318 (1976). The Agreement covers trade, agriculture, transportation and in-
dustrialization. Earlier in 1976, an agreement was reached in which Bolivia obtained a "free 
zone" at the Argentinian port of Rosario, while Bolivia agreed to increase the sale of natural 
gas to Argentina. Among other major projects, a $10 million petrochemical plant to jointly 
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welcome foreign investment, and Peru is increasing its emphasis 
on private enterprise. Apparently restrictions and controls on 
foreign investment are diminishing. 
Two recent ANCOM developments should be noted. In 1976, 
the five remaining nations agreed to create an Andean Reserve 
Fund.130 The purpose of the Fund is to "provide balance of 
payments support for the member countries ... [through a] ... 
joint administration of a fund formed from part of the interna-
tional monetary reserves of the member countries ... [and] ... 
orienting [these] financial resources toward placements which con-
tribute to the development of commerce in the subregion .... "131 
The Reserve Fund Agreement, which entered into force in 
1978,132 was provided with $240 million as capital,133 and -is run by 
an Assembly, a Board of Directors, and an Executive Presidency .134 
The Reserve Fund may undertake both debt and credit operations 
in furtherance of the goals of the treaty.135 
In 1977, the AN COM member-states agreed to create a Court 
of Justice within the Cartagena Agreement.136 The purpose of the 
Court is 
to guarantee the strict fulfillment of the commitments directly 
and indirectly deriving from the Cartagena Agreement . . . 
[because it is essential that] ... both the stability of the Car-
tagena Agreement and the rights and obligations deriving from 
it must be safe-guarded by a juridical entity at the highest level, 
independent of the governments of the member countries and 
from the other bodies of the Cartagena Agreement, with the 
authority to define communitarian law, resolve the controversies 
which arise under it, and to interpret it uniformly.137 
The Court, which is intended to sit in quito when constituted, will 
have five justices serving six-year terms and elected at three-year 
produce pesticides, already under construction, was speeded up in its construction schedule 
(under the authority of both States' petroleum entity). 
130. See Andean Group: Treaty for the Creation of the Andean Reserve Fund, 17 INT'L 
LEGAL MAT'LS 1191 (1979). 
131. Id. at 1191. 
132. Id. at 1191. 
133. Id. at art 5. 
134. Id. at art. 13. 
135. Id. at arts. 8, 9. 
136. See Andean Group: Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agree-
ment, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1203 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Court of Justice Treaty]. 
137. Id. at 1203. 
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rotating intervals. Provision was also made for the creation of the 
position of Attorney General subject to ANCOM agreement at a 
later date.138 The Court would have the power to consider acts of 
nullification and acts of noncompliance and to issue advisory opin-
ions to the ANCOM Commission.139 
The preceding measures operate on theories having little 
relevance to many of the exigencies of developing countries in the 
modern world. Tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions do not 
address the issue of what development must take place in order 
for a less developed nation, or group of nations, to participate in 
the global economic system. Such measures miss the point because 
they provide too little. 
At a time when the major economic problem facing Latin 
America is the shortage of capital,1'0 the ANCOM nations and cer-
tain other Latin American countries have imposed restrictions 
upon investment of foreign capital in their nations. An alternative 
course of action would be to liberalize licensing and business for-
mation requirements for foreign business and to offer incentives 
to foreign investors. The integrating nations, however, have been 
anxious about the ability of multinational or large foreign firms to 
maximize profits at the expense of those nations.141 This fear was 
especially felt in commodities for which correct transfer prices 
were difficult to establish. The correct transfer price is the price 
at which the commodity should be transferred to the related sub-
sidiaries of the investing multinationals in another country. 
Transfers of the benefits of technological advances in the form of 
138. Court of Justice Treaty, supra note 136, at art. 6; id. at art. 7, para. 1, 3; id. at art. 
9. 
139. Court of Justice Treaty, supra note 136, at ch. Ill; id. at arts. 17-22, 23-27, 28-31. 
140. What's in the Future? New Approaches to New Realities, WORLDWIDE P&I PLAN-
NING 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1972); Cahn, The Potential Exposure Problem: An Overlooked Inveset-
ment Decision, WORLDWIDE P&I PLANNING, (May-June 1972); Hendershott, THE CAPITAL 
SHORTAGE: HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW, 28 U. MICH. Bus. REv. 1 (1976) ("insuf-
fient growth in the capital stock since 1969"); Latin American Economic Growth, 44 MEX. 
AM. REV. 31 (1976); Economic Outlook for Latin America, 44 MEX. AM. REV. 30 (1976); 
Higson, Latin-U.S. Trade- A Bicentennial Appraisal, 44 MEX. AM. REV. 24 (1976); Juttner, 
Legal Safeguards for Direct Investment in LDCs, 9 INTER ECON. 259 (1976); Ereli, Private 
Investment Aspect of the Andean Common Market, XIV J. COM. MKT. STUD. 333 (1975); The 
IMF Wields Sudden New Power, Bus. WEEK, March 28, 1977 at 86; Stoneman, Foreign 
Capital and Economic Growth, 3 WORLD DEV. 11 (1975). 
141. Hague, Integration, Worldwide, Regional and Sectorial, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 103 
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hague]; MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS 
OF DEPENDENCE (197 4). 
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royalties and salaries to key personnel were at the heart of the 
abuses by the companies. m 
IV. THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM (SELA) 
Following the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly during which the Declaration and Program of 
Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Rights and Duties of States was adopted, 143 twenty-five Latin 
American nations meeting at Panama City in 1975 adopted a con-
vention creating the Sistema Economica Latinamericano 
(SELA).1" SELA is intended to be, "a permanent regional body for 
consultation, coordination, cooperation and joint economic and 
social promotion .... "145 In addition to the promotion of these ac-
tivities within the hemisphere, SELA is intended "to provide a 
permanent system of consultation and coordination for the adop-
tion of common positions and strategies on economic and social 
matters in international bodies and forums as well as before third 
countries and groups of countries."146 A lengthy list of more 
specific objectives covers Latin American-based multinational cor-
porations, agriculture, processing of raw materials for export, 
commodity price supports, acquisition of capital and high-level 
technology, regional financial growth, exchange of technological, 
scientific, educational, and cultural information, transportation 
and communications development, tourist growth and envi-
ronmental protection, and emergency assistance to member 
states.147 Other integration efforts are also promoted.148 
142. Note that some of the "abuses" involving payment of compensation to alien-
executives of multinational corporations resident in the "host" countries have actually been 
"encouraged" by the laws regarding taxation of, as well as the transfer and termination of, 
executive personnel. This practice is often in sharp contrast to practices under American 
law. See E. KOLDE, THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY: BEHAVIORAL AND MANAGERIAL ANALYSIS 
176 (1974). 
143. Text of resolutions along with reservations of five industrial nations (the United 
States, West Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom) as well as the draft resolu-
tions referred to ECOSOC reprinted in 13 INT"L LEGAL MAT'LS 715 (1974). 
144. See Latin American States: Convention Establishing the Latin American-
Economic System (SELA), 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS, 1081 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SELA/. 
The twenty-five signatories were Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazi~ Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Cuba, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemaf,a, 
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuef,a, id. at 1081. 
145. Id. at art. 2. 
146. Id. at art. 3(b). 
147. Id. at art. 5(1). 
148. Id. at art. 5(2-5). 
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SELA is governed by a Latin American Council, various Ac-
tion Committees, and a Permanent Secretariat1' 9 whose powers 
and duties are fully detailed.160 Within the first nine months after 
the adoption of the Convention, fifteen of the twenty-five states 
had ratified the Convention and had become member states of 
SELA.151 
One of the concerns with the establishment of SELA has been 
that SELA would either replace other regional agencies or 
weaken them, presumably because of duplicative efforts.152 
Venezuelan President Carlos Perez saw SELA as beneficial 
because it would free "itself from the more inflexible structures of 
traditional movements [which would] contribute[s] to more 
dynamic, more human and much more effective integration."153 In 
addition, SELA would be useful because it "will serve to 
demonstrate that our nationalism is not to be governed by the law 
of the strongest."154 Not all observers agree with the lack of con-
cern over the duplication of efforts. While there have been 
"dozens of declarations and agreements ... towards this objective 
(i.e., economic integration) ... there is no justification for the un-
necessary duplication of activities of organs such as SELA and 
CECLA."155 
One interesting area that SELA has been pursuing is the 
development of Latin American based multinational corporations 
whose goals would not be limited to "the maximization of profit 
and the more intensive use of capital and technology ,"156 but would 
be more oriented toward "the basic necessities of the peoples of 
149. Id. at art. 8. 
150. Id. at arts. 9-19, 20-26, 27-31 (respectively). 
151. Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela 
were included. See SELA supra note 61, at 1081. 
152. See Lorts & Schmitz, Latin American Economic Integration, 9 LAW. AMERICAS 
651, 655 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lorts & Schmitz]. 
153. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, 188; (May 1977), reprinted in Lorts & Schmitz, 
supra note 152. 
154. Id. The United States is not a signatory to the convention, nor a member of 
SELA. 
155. VaTgas-Hidalgo, Economic Integration, Development P/,anning and Sovereignty: 
A Latin American View, 9 LAW. AMERICAS 318, 321 (1977). 
156. Remarks of Jamie Moncayo, Permanent Secretary of SELA, in Comercio Exterior 
de Mexico, 451(No.1977) reprinted in Lott, Latin American Ec~nomic Integration, 10 LAW. 
AMERICAS 549, 561 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lott]. 
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Latin America."157 A major area of effort by SELA has been in the 
agriculture-nutrition sector.158 In 1977, SELA member-states an-
nounced ther intention to organize several Latin American 
multinational corporations who would devote their activities to 
the agriculture effort.159 One of the first activities is designed to in-
crease fertilizer production thereby elminating the region's heavy 
dependence upon imported fertilizers or fertilizer raw material.160 
Another major effort is that of organizing a Latin American 
network for technological information (Red de Informacion Tec-
nologica (RITLA), which is designed to "reduce the area's reliance 
upon technology brought in by transnational corporations."161 By 
the fall of 1978, consultation efforts among member state govern-
ments had begun on this project.162 SELA is also becoming involv-
ed in a number of international forums in order to provide a more 
powerful voice of its views.163 Efforts in 1978 and 1979 included 
participation in UNCT AD, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the North-South dialogue.164 
V. THE TREATY FOR AMAZONIAN COOPERATION 
One of the more recent regional efforts came about with the 
1978 signing of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, 165 by the 
eight nations who share the river basin of the Amazon.166 The pur-
pose of the treaty is "to promote the harmonious development of 
the Amazon region ... to raise the standard of living of their peoples 
... so as to achieve total incorproation of their Amazonian ter-
ritories into their respective national economies . . . ."167 This 
general cooperative effort is to be coordinated by an Amazonian 
157. Id. 
158. Id. at 562-63. 
159. See R. Benitez, Inter-American Legal Developments, 9 LAW. AMERICAS 340, 370 
(1977). 
160. See L. Fernandez, Latin American Economic Integration, 11 LAW. AMERICAS 151, 
158 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fernandez]. 
161. See Lott, supra note 156, at 1008. 
162. See Fernandez, supra note 160, at 158-159. 
163. See S. Rose, Latin American Economic Integration, 11 LAW. AMERICAS 521, 525 
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Rose]. 
164. Id. 
165. See Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1045 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Amazonian Treaty]. 
166. Id. The eight nations are Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, 
Surinam, and Venezuela. 
167. Amazonian Treaty, supra note 165, at 1045. 
27
Golbert and Gingold: Latin American Economic Integration
Published by SURFACE, 1980
210 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 7:183 
Cooperation Council compromised of "top level diplomatic Repre-
sentatives" of the parties to the treaty as well as a Secretariat.168 
The regional effort was intended to begin "on a relatively 
small scale, limited initially to the development of joint activities 
in such areas as hydrology, viability studies relating to economic 
projects, irrigation, reforestation, agricultural exploration, 
livestock production, fishing, road building, combined river, 
highway and railroad transport systems, social welfare projects 
and medical care."169 The potential development of the Amazon 
region is enormous because it is the "largest and richest basin in 
the world."110 Unfortunately, since the signing of the treaty, there 
has been almost no progress in the region.171 Indeed, there is some 
evidence to sugges.t that development and rational planning in the 
basin have actually retrogressed as evidenced by the rapacious ac-
tivities of large corporations in land clearing operations and 
bureaucratic mismanagement of ecological concerns in the 
Brazilian portion of the basin. The result could be "disastrous con-
sequences to the region, as brush invasion and soil erosion take 
over what was once a fertile area."172 
One of the problems is that there is some suspicion among 
Brazil's neighbors that Brazil's strong effort to promote the Trea-
ty for Amazonian Cooperation173 involved more than an interest in 
the development of the river basin. Others suspect that Brazil, not 
a member of ANCOM, would like to use the Amazonian Pact as a 
means of obtaining a voice in greater regional policies in order to 
expand its influence in the Pacific and Caribbean.174 A number of 
statements by Ecuadorian, Venezuelan, and Brazilian officials in 
1977 and 1978 lend credence to these suspicions.175 
168. Id. at arts. XXI, XXII. 
169. See Lott, supra note 156, at 569. The background of the meetings which led to the 
Pact is also discussed id. at 569. 
170. Id. at 569. 
171. See Rose, supra note 163, at 525. 
172. See Fernando, supra note 160, at 161, 162. 
173. The "Amazon Pact," was signed by the foreign ministers of Bolivia, Brazil, Colum-
bia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela (July 3, 1978), after an unusually short 
period of negotiations among the member-states (fifteen months). See Lott, supra note 156 
at 1011. For a review of the negotiations leading to the agreement, see, Lott, supra note 
156, at 569-571. 
17 4. See Lott, supra note 156, at 570-71. 
175. Id. at 1012. 
In 1980, as this article was going to press, several developments took place which may 
substantially affect the integration movement in Latin America. 
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By 1980, the exceedingly slow progress made by LAFT A towards a free trade area 
caused such widespread dissatisfaction among the member-states that it was believed im-
possible to reform LAFT A solely from within. Instead, an entirely new successor organiza-
tion, the Associacion Latinoamericano de Integracion (LAIA) was created with the goal of 
coming into existence by the end of 1980. Given that the nations which signed the Treaty of 
Montevideo in August, 1980 would have to renegotiate more than 12,000 national list conces-
sions, 7,000 non-extensive concessions, and 25 complementation pacts, it was not surprising 
that the goal of having LAIA's structure in place had fallen behind its timetable. It is now 
comtemplated for sometime in 1981. 
LAIA's purpose is not to create a customs union or free trade area. It is intended that 
the goals of the new organization be less ambitious than those of LAFTA, which may have 
failed because its objectives were out of touch with the realities of the individual needs of 
the member-states and their economic and social structures. LAIA will create a preferential 
treatment area through three mechanisms: Partial Agreements; Differential Treatments; 
and Preferential Margins. The first will permit bilateral agreements on selected items, 
although the agreements in question will remain open for other member-states' adherence 
at a later date, a process described as "convergency." The second will permit agreements 
between member-states based upon the classification of the member-states' overall 
economic situation. The third will establish general rules for reciprocal treatment among 
the member-states. 
The CACM integration treaty, which is due to expire in June, 1981, is facing serious 
problems because of differences among the member-states over the extent to which the pro-
posed reforms should be carried out. This stems from the differing economic situation in 
each of the member-states generally, as well as from the fact that some nations have receiv-
ed greater benefits from the treaty than others. 
The following problems within the region, as well as external relations with other na-
tions, have at the end of 1980 left the prospects for CACM after June, 1981 unclear. 
a. Following its 1979 revolution, Nicaragua has demanded major changes which 
would expand the economic orientation of the convention to include espousal 
of the social and political positions of the region. 
b. El Salvador supports the major changes proposed in 1976 by CACM's 
secretariat, Sieca, which call for major lowering of. barriers to the movement 
of people, goods, and capital as well as a significantly closer coordination of 
sector policies. 
c. Costa Rica, historically with little enthusiasm for regional integration, seeks 
little more than reductions in tariffs. 
d. Honduras, wishing to return to CACM for the first time since its withdrawal 
at the time of the 1969 "soccer war," wants to obtain preferential treatment 
because its economic situation is less advanced than its neighbors. 
e. Guatemala, the only member which has benefited from the current CACM ar-
rangements, not surprisingly wants no major changes (it has consistently had 
trade surpluses within its regional trade). 
Problems of a political nature in late 1980 caused deep divisions within ANCOM. Subse-
quent to the latest Bolivian coup d'etat (July, 1980), ANCOM issues an Andean Code of Con-
duct declaring the member-states' strong stand for human, political and social rights among 
their citizens and openly denouncing the latest Bolivian military regime. A month later, 
Bolivian delegates walked out of an ANCOM sectoral meeting, and Colombia refused to in-
vite Bolivian to attend a December meeting of the Andean heads of state on the grounds 
that only "legitimately elected heads of state "should attend. No solution to this rift is in 
sight, and it is possible that Bolivia will withdraw from ANCOM. 
For reports on these matters, see BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, New Integration Treaty 
Revises Ground Rules and Dismantles LAFTA 217 (July 9, 1980); id. at 307 (Sept. 24, 1980); 
id. at 329 (Oct. 15, 1980); id. at 379, 381 (Nov. 26, 1980). 
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